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
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# Good Governance in the Caribbean

## Reflections on Good Governance, Integrity and Corruption in Caricom Countries

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Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues

**Good Governance in the Caribbean<sup>1</sup>**  
Reflection on Good Governance, Integrity and  
Corruption in Caricom Countries  
*Leo Huberts<sup>2</sup>*

## **Introduction**

Ethics and integrity have become important topics in myriad social and policy spheres as well as in diverse scientific disciplines and bodies of knowledge. These aspects of governance without doubt also play a significant role in good governance research and policy making. This paper addresses integrity and ethics within the context of good governance, concentrating on a number of questions central to the inquiry into ethics and integrity in politics and administration, both national and international, with a focus on countries in the Caribbean.

First, the focus is on concepts (§ 2). What is the meaning of such central concepts as good governance, ethics, integrity, morality, values, and corruption? Special attention will be paid to integrity and ethics of governance. The following paragraph addresses the views on ‘good governance’, which puts ‘integrity’ in context of managing competing values (democracy, lawfulness, effectiveness and integrity).

Next, data about the reputation of Caricom countries on good governance are presented (§ 4). How do they score on the distinguished criteria and how do the countries perform compared to other Caricom countries? The data are contested, but also offer ‘food for thought’ for research and policy-making. The last part of

the paper builds on that, focusing on integrity of governance and anti-corruption policies (§ 5). What ideas might result from research on the working of anti-corruption initiatives in the rest of the world? With some ‘makamba’ reluctance, I finish with the idea that a Caribbean Integrity System (CIS) initiative might be possible and useful.

## ***Integrity of Governance***

What is the exact meaning of such related concepts as good governance, integrity, values, morals, ethics, and corruption, and how should they be defined? The following section provides brief definitions as a basis for the framework that underpins our analysis (Huberts et al., 2008). *Integrity* is viewed as a characteristic or quality of accordance with the relevant moral values and norms. For example, (public) officials act with integrity if their conduct is in harmony or accordance with relevant moral values and norms (including laws and rules). However, which values, norms, laws, and rules are *relevant* depends on the context. Moreover, even though individuals are the obvious agents that can act with or without integrity, this characteristic or quality can also be applied to other ‘objects’. That is, whereas very specific individual conduct can be judged in terms of integrity (e.g., appointing a family member, falsifying documents to boost profits), the object can also be a group, organisation, or even a society. Hence, when relevant moral values and norms can be distinguished for such an object, integrity judgments can occur and the group, organisation, or society may be seen to lack integrity, for example when its leaders and members abuse power and appear corruptible.

A *value* is a belief or quality that contributes to judgments about what is good, right, beautiful, or admirable, and thus weights the choice of action by both individuals and collectives. It is therefore less specific than a *norm*, which signals whether something is good or bad, right or wrong, beautiful or ugly. For conduct, norms answer the question ‘what is the correct thing to do?’ Nevertheless, not all values and norms are relevant for integrity judgements; because integrity is not concerned with what is beautiful (aesthetics), what is conventional (etiquette), or what works (technology). Hence, our discussion concentrates on ‘moral’ norms and values.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper briefly summarizes the conceptual framework that was promised in the proposal, but I decided to pay more attention to the situation and possible policies in the Caribbean, primarily based on desk research. Such content seems more relevant for SIDSGG than focusing primarily on conceptual and theoretical issues. See for a more extended reflection on concepts: Huberts, 2010.

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*Moral* refers to what is right or wrong or good or bad and therefore involves the values and norms people feel rather strongly about, usually because they are important for the community to which they belong (i.e. there is a claim to more general validity and conformity). Thus, the terms ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ are both used to refer to what is right or wrong or good or bad, and the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ are often used interchangeably (Frederickson & Ghore, 2005; Lawton & Doig, 2006; Thompson, 1995). Nevertheless, some scholars see morals as referring to the principles of right and wrong and *ethics* as the study of those principles. Whichever the definition, these ideas depend heavily on the concept of *wrong*, under which rubric corruption usually falls.

*Corruption*, whether defined broadly or narrowed down to such actions as bribery, refers to the misuse of authority to gain the favours or benefits offered by external parties with an interest in past, present, or future decision-making. Much of the public debate, policy-making, and theory development in ethics on an international level is focused on the concept of corruption rather than on ethics or integrity. Corruption violates integrity standards, but there is more conduct that is violating the ‘moral framework’ of functionaries. At VU University we use a typology that distinguishes between 10 types of violations<sup>3</sup>:

Corruption (bribing, favouritism by supervisors, favouritism by employees), fraud, theft, conflict of interest (through gifts or jobs), improper use of authority,

misuse and manipulation of information, indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers (discrimination, sexual harassment, other indecent treatment), waste and abuse of organisational resources, and private time misconduct.

For every type of integrity violation, more or less serious forms of conduct are distinguishable, dependant on their distance from the norms and values. For example, the amount of private gain or money involved in bribery can vary enormously and sexual harassment can range from a sexist remark to rape. Not only is corruption in the form of bribery a crime in many countries, as conduct that violates the relevant moral values and norms, it is generally considered a serious *integrity violation*. Nevertheless, what is seen as a violation depends on the relevant norms and values and thus on the context (in time and place).

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<sup>3</sup> Based on an analysis of the relevant literature on police integrity and corruption (e.g., Alatas, 1990; Benaissa, 1993; Caiden, 1988; Heidenheimer, Johnston, & Levine 1989; Klitgaard, 1988), and its evaluation against the results of empirical research on internal police force investigations, leading to a first typology, used and tested in empirical research in different public organizations, and validated (Lasthuizen, 2008; also Kolthoff 2007). The typology explicitly incorporates violations of the law, violations of moral norms and values (both formal and informal), and functional violations within an organization, including off-duty misconduct, activities that serve private personal interests, and misconduct in favor of the organization (‘noble cause corruption’) (Lamboo 2005).

**Table 1: Definition of a Number of Concepts**

<i>Integrity</i> : characteristic or quality that refers to accordance with the relevant moral values and norms.
<i>Relevant</i> : valid within the context.
<i>Moral</i> : characteristic of right or wrong, good or bad (general and unavoidable).
<i>Morals</i> : the collection of moral values and norms which provides a framework for judging and acting.
<i>Ethics</i> 1 synonymous with morals; 2 the systematic reflection on morality.
<i>Value</i> : belief or quality that contributes to judgments about what is good, right, beautiful or admirable.
<i>Norm</i> : prescription on what is correct in a certain situation.
<i>Integrity violation</i> : conduct that violates the relevant moral values and norms
<i>Corruption</i> : the abuse of entrusted power (both in the private and public sectors) for improper goals (private gain in a broad sense).

### ***Ethics and Integrity***


The exact relation between ‘ethics’ and ‘integrity’ is a confusing one for several reasons. First, clear and consistent usage of the concept of integrity and its relation to ethics is hindered by the fact the English noun ‘integrity’ lacks an adjective equivalent to the Dutch *integer*, French *intègre*, and German *integer*. It is therefore common to speak about the integrity of a politician or a police officer but very unusual to refer (like Carter, 1996) to an integer person, politician, or police officer. The result is a marked preference for such phrases as ‘ethical conduct’ rather than ‘integer conduct’.

Another contributing factor is people’s tendency to connect ethics (and its implicit connotations) with the ‘basics’ of policy but ‘integrity’ with actual behaviour. For example, although it seems quite natural to judge a policy on ethics (in terms

of right or wrong, good or bad), when assessing the conduct of politicians and civil servants, we find integrity the most appropriate yardstick. We then talk, for example, about the integrity of a president or the lack of integrity of the Houses of Parliament in the UK (e.g., the expenses scandal).

To bring some conceptual clarity, Figure 1 outlines a view on the relationship between ethics and integrity. Here, *policy ethics*, which addresses the ethical aspects of policy and decision content, focuses on the ‘goodness’ and or ‘badness’ of the output or outcome of policy- and decision-making processes. Scholars in the enormously broad field of policy ethics tend to reflect on such life and death topics as abortion and euthanasia, medical care, nuclear energy, war and peace, biodiversity, food safety (genetic manipulation), and human stem cell research.

**Figure 1: Policy ethics, and the ethics and integrity of governance**



However, when we discuss ‘integrity’, the focus is not on policy content (output and outcome) but on the process of government or governance leading to a policy.<sup>4</sup> Put bluntly, a decision to go to war or refrain from it, like the choice of more liberal or more conservative policies on abortion, can be made with or without integrity. Thus, integrity is at stake, and subject to possible violation, whenever government functionaries are involved in preparing, taking and implementing decisions. Do conflicts of interest exist because of promised campaign funds, for example? Do only specific lobbyists or interest groups have access to decision-makers? Is the law in accordance with the promises made during election time?

The distinction between policy ethics and integrity is related to the different aspects and phases of the policy-making and implementation processes, which are often modelled in terms of agenda setting and formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of policies.

Every phase of the process can be related to the ethics and integrity of the involved actors and/or policy. Just to mention one example: US President Barack Obama’s agenda setting on ethics resulted on his first full day in office (January 21, 2009) in executive orders that put in place ethics guidelines for staff members of his administration. These orders – concentrate on lobbyists’ influence in Washington, the ‘revolving doors’ that carry special interest influence in and out of the government.<sup>5</sup> Or in other words: Obama started with the integrity of agenda setting and policy development.

Figure 2 illustrates what different categories of ethics and integrity can to be distinguished, based on a number of the mentioned dimensions. The first dimension is the content of policy decisions versus the formulation and

implementation of these decisions. The second is policy formulation and decision-making versus the implementation of policy decisions. The third is ethics as the relevant moral values and norms versus integrity as behaving in accordance with these moral values, norms and rules.

Grand ethics concerns the ethics of policy *content*. Is the policy content ethically acceptable? Is it right or wrong, good or bad to support the ‘war against terrorism’, to give national priority to the fight against organised crime, et cetera.


Integrity is about the behavior of the politicians and public servants involved in preparing, making and implementing those policy choices. Integrity concerns the question whether that behavior is in accordance with the relevant moral values and norms for that behavior.

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<sup>4</sup> There are clear parallels with the extensive discussion on types of justice: procedural justice, which involves the fairness of decision-making processes; distributive justice, which concerns fairness in the distribution of rights or resources; and corrective justice, addressing fairness in the rectification of wrongdoings (Treviño, & Weaver, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/ExecutiveOrder-EthicsCommitments/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrder-EthicsCommitments/)

**Figure 2: Grand, elite and street-level ethics and integrity in policy**



The same distinctions are relevant for other than the public sector. For business, corporate ethics concerns the content of strategies and policies (and products), corporate integrity the moral quality of the decision-making processes at all levels (Six et al., 2007).

### **Good Governance**

Ethics and integrity of governance address the morality of those who govern and implement rather than evaluating the quality of the decision or policy. How does integrity relate to 'good governance'?

There are many different interpretations of the concept 'good governance' (De Graaf et al. 2011<sup>6</sup>). One interpretation primarily stems from business administration and business practices, stimulated by scandals, Enron, Parmalat, Ahold etc.. The good governance then focused on the internal distribution of power and authority that was responsible for the failures as well as the lacking accountability towards and involvement of the many stake-holders. This resulted in new rules and institutions (US) or in extensive self-regulation (e.g. Netherlands and Tabaksblatt code). Good governance then is 'corporate governance' with another division of power and accountability; it is more about power than about morals and ethics.<sup>7</sup>

Another, second vision on good governance focuses more on the principles or standards or values. Many principles and values are put forward then. Some point at the (constitutional) rules and principles of law, others add values as for example legitimacy, democracy, transparency and openness, responsiveness, accountability, integrity, sustainability<sup>8</sup>, equitability, effectiveness and efficiency.

Thompson points at financial, legal, or democratic principles (Thompson 2001: 79, 91), the UN states that good governance is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient and it follows the rule of law. The World Bank collects information on indicators of governance, implicitly pointing at what is good or bad (Kaufmann, Kraay &

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Value states that organizations should reflect on their mission, legitimacy (stake-holders) and organization in a coherent way.

<sup>8</sup> Goede (2009) for example points at sustainability as crucial for good governance. On the one hand this value refers to the content of decisions and policies (with as buzz words ecology, climate etc.). On the other hand it points at a neglected aspect of the process of governance (in all phases): is the interest of 'future generations' represented in those processes? Food for thought for the quality of governance criterion 'responsiveness and democracy': can we limit ourselves to present stake-holders.

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<sup>6</sup> G. de Graaf, Van der Wal & Van montfort (Eds.), Good Governance Special of the Journal Bestuurskunde, to be published Summer 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Mark Moore's (1995) related focus on the public sector's responsibility to create Public

Mastruzzi, 2009)<sup>9</sup>: The six dimensions of governance are: 1 Voice and Accountability (incl. participation and freedom rights); 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence; 3. Government Effectiveness (services, civil service, policy process); 4. Regulatory Quality (policy formulation and implementation, promotion of private sector development; 5. Rule of Law (incl. the quality of the police and the courts) and 6. Control of Corruption.

Another model is presented in Figure 3, trying to combine values in a number of central criteria (based on Bovens et al., 2001).


Good governance criteria then concern democracy, lawfulness, effectiveness and integrity. It is clear that integrity is interconnected with democracy, lawfulness and economy, but the attractiveness of the framework as a heuristic device is that it points out a number of dilemmas in the study of the integrity of governance. Such a model enables practitioners and scholars to reflect more systematically on the limitations as well as possibilities of the mentioned criterions, including integrity.

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<sup>9</sup> The six dimensions of governance will be explained more in detail later in this paper, when the Caricom scores are presented.



**Figure 3: *Quality of governance criteria***



### ***Criticism and alternative views***

The criticism on this type of modeling good governance often is that 1. the selected values are linked to specific often western-centered ideas about governance, serving the interests of those nations and international organizations. and 2. that decision-makers in all countries and contexts always are confronted with dilemmas and tensions between mentioned values, while models suggest there might be a harmonious mix of the values in actual governance.

The first argument points at the possibility and/or desirability of seeking global consensus on what constitutes ethical political and public administrations. Since much of the existing research in this area was derived from Western thought, the frameworks may or may not represent the political and social best practices of the rest of the world (Benaissa 1993; Punch et al. 1993; Pieth and Eigen 1999). While the moralist approach contends that all corruption is undesirable, the functionalist approach argues that there are conditions when bribing and corruptive acts are good for a society and that political, economic, and social relationships might suffer if such behaviors are extinguished (Johnson 2004, p. 155-163; Bardhan 1997).

On the question of who are the beneficiaries of such efforts, one group states it is a win-win outcome for everyone from rich industrialized nations to developing countries. The other side states that institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund contribute to the development of a global free market capitalism which ultimately harms the poor and powerless and, thus, address the ethicality of forcing a developing country in the direction of a market economy and private enterprise (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2005; Pieth and Eigen 1999; UNDP 1998). Doubt also exists

regarding the purity of interest in anti-corruption efforts from countries with varying political agendas, from developing nations where dictators control public funds to international super powers who use their economic might for political and military ends. Many very corrupt countries were among the first to ratify the UN Convention Against Corruption ... (Huberts et al. 2008).

In my view many transitional and developing countries offer examples of the subjectivity of the presented frameworks. 'Western values' are prominent, starting from the idea that a liberal democracy and a free market are good, including the separation of politics and administration, between the state and society, between the public and the private. No private gain from public power is the central element in the struggle against corruption. However, many countries offer examples of political and administrative systems with interrelationships between the mentioned spheres. The moral values and norms that apply to types of connectedness, favoritism and patronage also differ. How to deal with the manifold interpretations and beliefs concerning good governance?

A possible perspective is related to the acknowledgement of the fact that there is by definition tension between the values that are relevant for good governance (argument 2) and that the 'best way out' will differ in different contexts.

Though proponents of relating the good of governance to moral values are often criticized for that, almost no one of the scholars in this field support the idea that all values can be consistently and coherently (or harmoniously) realized in decision-making and implementation. Tension, conflict and choice are dominant. There is no single best outcome.

Some then come to a relativistic position: all depends on context, nothing can be said about the relative importance of values (stereotyped as 'anything goes'). Others are 'pluralistic', recognizing the variation of values as well as the normative character of all proposed 'ways out', but at the same time involved to try to sketch what matters more and less in the context reflected upon (Spicer, 2010: value pluralism; Huberts, 2010b).

As a consequence, an important element of good governance then is that it is important to take into account 'managing the tension between values'. In value pluralism, for example integrity, is an important aspect of good governance, but the context can justify that for example favoritism is taken for granted, temporarily, because it helps the effectiveness and/or legitimacy of policies. That position does not make favoritism morally acceptable, but it acknowledges that abolishing it might have negative or even devastating consequences for other values.

The distinction between different criteria is also important because the credibility of them is interconnected. A government that starts a campaign against corruption and installs new corruption fighting bodies, but that is violating the rule of law, and/or is not democratic and legitimate and/or is unable to operate effectively, cannot expect that the proclaimed campaign is taken serious. This relates to what In 't Veld (2006) called 'virtue as prosthesis for governance'.

### **Good Governance in Caricom Countries**

Good governance concerns coping with democracy and responsiveness, lawfulness, effectiveness and efficiency and integrity and morality. This makes it interesting and challenging to try to find out how states in different parts of the world perform concerning those criteria and values. This paragraph will present some data on Caricom countries, more specifically I will summarize the scores on the World Governance Indicators, a project of researchers of primarily the World Bank ((Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009). Their project is admired as well the object of serious criticism, because they primarily rely on existing surveys among business people and firms, non governmental organizations, risk analyst and citizens/households. As a consequence, the data

primarily concern the perception of the reputation of countries (which might be different from the actual state of affairs).

The World Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports composite measures of six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.<sup>10</sup> What follows is information about the four criteria that were selected as central values for good governance: Integrity (in WGI control of corruption), Democracy (Voice and Accountability), Effectiveness (Government Effectiveness) and Lawfulness (Rule of Law).

Table 2 presents the WGI information that is available for 2009 for a number of Caricom

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<sup>10</sup> The six dimensions of governance are: 1. *Voice and Accountability (VA)* – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 2. *Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV)* – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 3. *Government Effectiveness (GE)* – capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 4. *Regulatory Quality (RQ)* – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 5. *Rule of Law (RL)* – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 6. *Control of Corruption (CC)* – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

countries.<sup>11</sup> The percentage points at the relative position of the 11 most populated Caricom countries. The higher the percentage, the better the score. A '90-100%' score means being among the 10% of best performing countries in the world. A 0-10% score means being among the worst scoring countries globally.

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<sup>11</sup> Data are available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm>. This website contains information about all countries of the world as well as interactive possibilities to extract, combine and report data and results.

**Table 2: WGI Indicators 11 Caricom States**

WGI INDICATORS 2009 COUNTRY	INTEGRITY ANTI- CORRUPTION	DEMOCRACY	EFFECTIVE-NESS	LAWFULL- NESS
ARUBA	82.4	90.0	89.5	89.2
BAHAMAS	90.0	79.1	81.0	72.6
BARBADOS	86.7	86.7	91.4	81.6
BELIZE	56.7	69.2	41.4	44.3
GRENADA	67.1	72.5	62.9	59.0
GUYANA	35.2	51.7	47.1	33.0
HAITI	11.0	30.3	4.8	5.7
JAMAICA	40.0	62.6	58.6	36.8
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES	76.2	58.3	74.3	76.9
SURINAME	46.2	59.2	54.8	51.4
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	55.7	61.1	64.3	49.1

Categories: above 70%, between 30% en 50% en below 30%

**Table 3: Ranking 11 Caribbean States on Four Good Governance Indicators**

WGI INDICATORS 2009 COUNTRY	INTEGRITY ANTI- CORRUPTION	DEMOCRACY	EFFECTIVE-NESS	LAWFULL- NESS
ARUBA	3	1	2	1
BAHAMAS	1	3	3	4
BARBADOS	2	2	1	2
BELIZE	6	5	10	8
GRENADA	5	4	6	5
GUYANA	10	10	9	10
HAITI	11	11	11	11
JAMAICA	9	6	7	9
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES	4	9	4	3
SURINAME	8	8	8	6
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	7	7	5	7

Which of the 11 Caricom countries is performing best in 'good governance', combining the four criteria? When the rankings on the different criteria are combined by a simple contestable calculation, adding up the relative rankings, the following picture arises.

Aruba and Barbados score best, followed by the Bahamas (green). Grenada, the Netherlands Antilles and Trinidad and Tobago are performing 'second best', Belize, Jamaica and Suriname are in the 'grey' disputed area and Guyana and Haiti are worst performing (in red).

**Table 4: Over-all Image of 11 Caribbean States on Good Governance Indicators**

WGI INDICATORS 2009 COUNTRY	TOTAL RANK	(Ranking total criteria) 4	INTE- GRITY	DEMO- CRACY	EFFECTI VE-NESS	LAW- FULL- NESS
ARUBA	1-2	7	3	1	2	1
BAHAMAS	3	11	1	3	3	4
BARBADOS	1-2	7	2	2	1	2
BELIZE	7	29	6	5	10	8
GRENADA	4-5	20	5	4	6	5
GUYANA	10	39	10	10	9	10
HAITI	11	44	11	11	11	11
JAMAICA	9	31	9	6	7	9
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES	4-5	20	4	9	4	3
SURINAME	8	30	8	8	8	6
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	6	26	7	7	5	7

I am presenting these data primarily as ‘food for thought’.

As mentioned before, the research methods are disputable, it’s all about image and reputation which might differ from reality, but it also seems important to realize that ‘reputation matters’.

#### ***Does corruption reputation matter?***

Why would or should a country bother about its governance reputation, and in particular its corruption reputation? Isn’t corruption and favoritism ‘facts of life’, almost impossible to eradicate, also because they are part of the existing culture and expectations?

This not very unusual line of reasoning can be opposed with reference to the fact that systems of favoritism and corruption have enormously damaging consequences for politics, administration, economy and society, and that there are examples of states with promising successes in improving good governance.

First, it is indisputable that there is a relationship between corruption and lack of governance and poverty. Experts dispute about the character of the causality: makes corruption a country more poor, or makes poverty a country more corrupt (Treisman, 2007<sup>12</sup>). Probably both are true,

<sup>12</sup> Treisman concluded (2007: 211): “Quite strong evidence suggests that highly developed, long-established liberal democracies, with a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a history of openness to trade, are perceived as less corrupt. Countries that

which makes it worthwhile to escape from the interrelationship between lack of good governance and poverty.

It is also clear that corruption always damages societal interests. Corruption is stealing from the public (interests), favoring personal, family, party or group interests. Public services are harmed, in particular at the costs of the poor<sup>13</sup> To quote former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his statement on the adoption by

depend on fuel exports or have intrusive business regulations and unpredictable inflation are judged more corrupt. Although the causal direction is usually unclear, instrumenting with income as of 1700 suggests higher development does cause lower perceived corruption. However, controlling for income, most factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently available measures of actual corruption experiences (based on surveys of business people and citizens that ask whether they have been expected to pay bribes recently). Reported corruption experiences correlate with lower development, and possibly with dependence on fuel exports, lower trade openness, and more intrusive regulations. The subjective data may reflect opinion rather than experience, and future research could usefully focus on experience-based indicators”. Also: Lambsdorff, 2005 and De Graaf et al. 2010.

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.un.org/events/10thcongress/2088b.htm>; 5-11-2010.

the General Assembly of the United Nations Convention against Corruption:

“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid.”<sup>14</sup>

Estimations of the damage of corruption vary, but on a global scale the amount always sums up to many billions.

Additional to the mentioned effects of corruption, also corruption reputation as in the Corruption Perception index has effects of its own. When business leaders and risk consider a country corrupt, it can be expected that corporations and governments are reluctant to invest. “Corrupt practices drain government coffers, play havoc with free trade and scare away investors. The World Bank estimates that corruption can reduce a country's growth rate by 0.5 to 1.0 percentage points per year. IMF research has shown that investment in corrupt countries is almost 5 per cent less than in countries that are relatively corruption-free”.<sup>15</sup>

Another effect concerns undermining the state and the trust of citizens in political and administrative institutions. These consequences can be far reaching. When the benefits of the state are only distributed to the elite, society can revolt (Egypt 2011). And when only specific (ethnic, political, regional) parts of the population benefit, this can lead to disruption, protest and even civil war because of the corrupted regime.

### ***What Might Be Done to Promote Integrity and Control Corruption***

The next part of the paper puts safeguarding integrity and controlling corruption in the center of attention. What policies and institutions are available to achieve those aims? What experiences in other contexts and countries might be useful?

The concentration on corruption and integrity means that the focus is more narrow than the sketched ‘good governance’ perspective. This limitation arises from practical reasons on the one hand. Research on effectiveness of institutions and policies is complicated and the work that is familiar to me centers around corruption and integrity. On the other hand, there is the thesis that controlling corruption is not only crucial for the improvement of governance, but that it also offers a starting point for that improvement. This is illustrated by international organizations as the UN and the World Bank. Their policies are on good governance, specific activities and demands concentrate on anti-corruption (Klein Haarhuis, 2005).

Easy answers are not available and an over-all picture is absent. What I will try to do, is give a first impression of some of the research that has been done, leading to a number of lessons that might be relevant, also for countries in the Caribbean.

### ***Research on Effective Integrity Systems***

The last years work has been done by researchers on the institutions and policies meant to curb corruption and to safeguard integrity. Among them are 1. the international comparative work on specific anti-corruption agencies by ANCORAGE-NET, a leading research network on anti-corruption agencies committees and bureaus<sup>16</sup> and 2. the description and evaluation of many National Integrity Systems (putting anti-corruption institutions in context) and a related (Local Integrity System) project on anti-corruption systems in metropolitan areas.

To present an illustration of this research, I will first summarize very briefly the history of an Anti corruption institution which is considered successful, and then put this type of institution

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<sup>14</sup> Annan 2006. Ook : <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html?ref=menuseide>

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.un.org/events/10thcongress/2088b.htm>: cijfers Wereldbank, opgesomd door VN.

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<sup>16</sup> See <http://ancorage-net.org>.

into the context of the lessons to be learned from integrity system research.

***Hong Kong: what worked***<sup>17</sup>

In the 1960's and 1970's, Hong Kong was a city state, part of the United Kingdom, an enclave surrounded by the Peoples Republic of China, with a reputation of 'rampant corruption'. This conflicted with the ambition to become one of the leading financial centers in Asia which resulted in the establishment of the Independent Commission Against Corruption. It was recognized from the beginning that prevention was as important as the deterrent of prosecution, and the battle against corruption could only be won by changing people's attitude towards graft. ICAC is famous for that 'three-pronged strategy': Law Enforcement, Corruption Prevention and Community Education. ICAC is also special because it also addresses corruption in the private and business sector.


The strategy is effective in ICAC's eyes and remains its guiding strategy. Serviced by a central Administration Branch, three independent departments take care of the activities.

Serviced by a central Administration Branch, three interdependent departments organize the activities. The Operations Department receives, considers and investigates alleged corruption offences (including anonymous reports). This department is by far the largest. The Corruption Prevention Department examines practices and procedures of government departments and public bodies to reduce corruption opportunities and offers free and confidential corruption prevention advice to private organizations upon request. The Community Relations Department educates the public against the evils of corruption and enlists public support in combating corruption.

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<sup>17</sup> For example Law 2008, Cheung, 2008. Also: <http://www.icac.org.hk/en/home/index.html>.

Figure 4: ICAC Hong Kong<sup>18</sup>



<sup>18</sup> [http://www.icac.org.hk/en/about\\_icac/os/index.html](http://www.icac.org.hk/en/about_icac/os/index.html)



The comprehensiveness of the strategy included the investment of a lot of resources into ICAC. In 2010 ICAC has about 1200 staff (on a population of seven million).

The success of the strategy shows in the Hong Kong's score in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. HK was nr. 13 in 2010, scoring 8.4 (1-10 scale), better than all Caribbean countries (Barbados being seen as least corrupt among them with 7.8). Hong Kong became the financial center it strived for, with a positive reputation as successful corruption fighter. Remarkably, the transition to the People's Republic of China in 1997, under the principle of 'one country, two systems', did not change that reputation (China's CPI is 3.5).

One remark should be added to the success story though. The apparent success in the Asian context of a city state with financial ambitions and specific social and cultural does not mean that the model is wise elsewhere. Hong Kong's development towards more prosperity makes the huge investment in anti-corruption an understandable and profitable one, but there are not many states that can afford this type of investment.

### *National Integrity Systems<sup>19</sup>*

Since the beginning of this century on many countries assessments have been published about their National Integrity Systems.<sup>20</sup> The NIS perspective was developed by Transparency International and Jeremy Pope as a model to use, describe and evaluate what countries can do and do to fight corruption and to safeguard integrity. The overall goal of the NIS model is to promote the integrity of governance in society. It is summarized in Figure 5. The model is built on and sustained by *foundations*, which comprise public awareness and society's values. If public awareness is high and values are strong, they will support the *pillars*, which rest on them. On the other hand, if the public is apathetic and not watchful, or if the values are widely lacking, then the foundations will be weak. On top of the roof are three *round balls*; they represent important principles, including sustainable development of effective and efficient public services, government functioning under law and quality of life. These goals reflect the broad significance of NIS systems for countries, including developing countries.

The pursuit of the goals of the NIS is rooted in the conviction that all of the issues of contemporary concern in the area of governance – capacity development, results orientation, public participation, and the promotion of national integrity – need to be addressed in an integrated or holistic fashion. The NIS approach works through a number of crucial institutions, sectors or activities – the *pillars*. These include the political will to fight corruption, an active parliament to attain and sustain good governance and to fight corruption, an auditor-general as

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<sup>19</sup> The NIS description is based on Huberts, Anechiarico and Six, 2008, 5-7. For more detailed information about the NIS-model, see the website of Transparency International, the leading international non-governmental organization devoted to combating corruption, that developed and promoted the concept of NIS: [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org) and; Pope, J. (Ed), 1996, National Integrity Systems: the TI Sourcebook. Berlin: Transparency International.

[www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org) and; Pope, J. (Ed), 1996, National Integrity Systems: the TI Sourcebook.

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[http://transparency.org/policy\\_research/nis/nis\\_reports\\_by\\_country](http://transparency.org/policy_research/nis/nis_reports_by_country)

watchdog over financial integrity, an attorney general as 'guardian of the public interest', a public service system designed to protect the public decision-making process, the judiciary and the protection of the rule of law, an ombudsman, independent anti-corruption agencies, adequate procedures for public procurement, accounting and financial management, a private sector operating within the laws and public awareness, media, civil society and international organizations supportive of ethics and integrity.


The NIS also encourages the pillars to work together, as stakeholders in developing a plan and assessing 'the systemic identification of gaps and weaknesses, as well as opportunities for strengthening or augmenting each of these pillars into a coherent framework' (Pope, 1996) – in terms of interrelationships, interdependence and combined effectiveness in a 'holistic approach'. Pillars are not necessarily of equal strength but the overall impact can be achieved through over-compensation by certain pillars (for example, a proactive anti-corruption agency offsetting weak investigative journalism).

In the NIS approach the main criterion for judging the quality of the system, although often only implicitly, is the completeness of the system; are all pillars and elements of the NIS present? This approach was taken by Doig and McIvor (Transparency International, 2001) in their study of many national integrity systems.<sup>21</sup>

Figure 5: *Elements of a National Integrity System* (Source: Pope 1996)

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<sup>21</sup> See also an interesting substudy by the same authors on the small islands in the Caribbean: Doig and McIvor, 2004.



An additional conclusion Doig and McIver came to, based on 18 country studies (2003: 330-331), was that

“the NIS provides the basis of an adaptive approach in terms of means and measurable in terms of performance and impact as well as in terms of progress, across institutions, countries and time, and in identifying good practice in operation. Updating country reports and comparing inter-institutional and inter-country progress gives the impetus to avoid becoming too engaged in the process—combating corruption—at the expense of the purpose building toward the delivery of the ultimate NIS objectives.

Such an approach has a universal resonance, articulated by Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados, in June 1999 when he called for ‘a new form of governance’:

After 30 years of independence, the State cannot retreat as a force for good in Caribbean development. It must redefine its purposes. It must refocus its strategic vision. It must reform its way of doing business. It must reinvent itself to be relevant to today’s purposes and tomorrow’s needs. It must build new strategic alliances with the private sector, the non-governmental institutions, and all the institutions of our civil society to create a new Caribbean, ordered in accordance with

the precepts of a just and equitable and good society . . .

It can also reasonably be argued that there has, in our region, been too destructive a competition for political office; too heavy a concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elites, an unhealthy preservation of antidevelopmental party and tribal divisions, a focus on short-term partisan political concerns rather than longterm strategic objectives, an efficient patronage and spoils systems which work against sound and progressive Government . . .

It surely must be the mission of this generation to make consensus building the foundation of a new form of Governance; to make popular and effective participation and inclusion, the key facets of our political culture, and to fashion a society in which the people’s business and the Government’s business are one and the same thing . . . (Commonwealth Innovations, 1999, pp. 8, 9).

The OECD’s (2000) focus in ethics infrastructure identifies similar actors at the national level (such as legislature, executive, judiciary, auditor-general, ombudsman, watchdog agencies and civil society), but does not follow the Pope’s temple metaphor.

The Australian NISA approach actually replaces the Greek temple approach advocated by

Transparency International with a bird's nest metaphor for a more interdependent network representation (Sampford et al., 2005). TI's temple metaphor suggests that the whole temple is as strong as the weakest pillar, while the Australian NISA's bird's nest metaphor suggests that 'a multitude of often weak institutions and relationships can combine to more effectively protect and promote the fragile goal of public integrity' (Sampford et al., 2005: 96). Their research suggests that the cumulative interrelationships may be more important than the individual institutions, which is suggested by the temple metaphor.

### ***Local Integrity Systems***

Building upon the work done on national integrity systems, VU University developed an international comparative study on local integrity systems, paying attention to the policies, practices and actors at the local government level that aim to fight corruption and safeguard integrity (Huberts, Anechiarico & Six, 2008). For seven big cities or metropolitan areas the LIS was described and evaluated: Sydney/New South Wales, New York, Hong Kong, London, Hamburg, Amsterdam and Antwerp.

A number of conclusions and lessons learned were 'Pay Attention' and 'Involve Leadership', 'Create Central Integrity Agency', 'Aim at All (including politicians)', 'Balance Types of Strategies' and 'Reflect on Effectiveness'. These 'lessons' will be the starting points for a concluding reflection on the development of 'Caribbean Integrity Systems'.

### ***What To Do in Caricom: Bold Suggestions***

Of course, the framework that was sketched and the presented preliminary research results about good governance and corruption control, cannot be translated into simple conclusions on 'what to do' in the Caribbean.

Nevertheless, a number of conclusions follow, as bold suggestions, as 'food for thought'.

### ***Comparison and hope***

First, the data on good governance indicators including corruption control of a number of countries in the Caribbean seem to make it worthwhile to further reflect on the quality of governance, also in a comparative perspective.

Countries differ (a lot) and subcategories might learn a lot from the presence and evaluation of policies and institutions that seem to work. This potential also becomes evident when it is taken into account that the reputation of countries is all but stable. Improvement is possible.

Therefore I will finish with a suggestion concerning a 'CIS' initiative, connecting researchers and policymakers in this area with the aim to learn (knowledge) and to learn from each others experiences (policy).

### ***Leadership***

Second, the involvement of leadership is crucial for the credibility and effectiveness of good governance and corruption control policies and institutions.

A problem always is that curbing favoritism and corruption has a prisoner's dilemma character. When a party is in power, it has no incentives to curb corrupt benefits of the state for their own supporters (to govern better), when there is no agreement with the opposing party to do the same when they come to power. Standard practice is to accuse the 'others' of corruption and bad governance, to preach good governance and integrity and in practice to continue favoritism and patronage.

From both sides statesmanship is requested, from government and opposition, in everybody's interest in the longer run, but statesmanship is exceptional.

More often outside pressure seems necessary to end grand corruption by (succeeding) elites. This can come from big scandal and or national uprising and revolution in particular against dictatorships (see the Arabic world) or from external international pressure (IMF, WB, UN, but these outside organizations are seldom in the position to do that with credibility and effectiveness).

### ***Vision***

A comprehensive vision on corruption is important to make the fight against it successful. Too often policies concentrate on specific groups as for example (petty corruption by parts of) the civil service, and others are excluded (most often grand corruption by politicians). Such a selectivity is by definition disastrous for the effectiveness of the policy. Additionally, it might

be wise to include the private and business sector in policies, as Hong Kong and its ambition showed.

Another aspect is that corruption is a multi-faceted phenomenon and in many societies it's more about favoritism and conflict of interest than on large scale theft and bribing.<sup>22</sup>

A last and very important element is that we are dealing not only with what is wrong but also with integrity and values in a positive sense. Policies should include a description of the values to be promoted as well as prevention and education. The UN Code of Conduct for Public Officials<sup>23</sup> offers examples of the values as loyalty to the public interest, efficiency, effectiveness and integrity, lawfulness, attentiveness, fairness and impartiality.

### ***Organization and strategy***

The organization of integrity and anti-corruption is relevant as well. An independent Central Integrity Agency that collects, investigates and punishes violations, possibly in combination with prevention and education, is often mentioned as a success factor.

Many strategies and policies can be used to control corruption and to safeguard integrity. Two basic strategies are often distinguished: compliance strategies based on rules and sanctions and value or integrity strategies based on motivation, consciousness and prevention (Trevino et al, 1999). Both are necessary to curb corruption, as also the example of Hong Kong's ICAC indicated.

### ***Towards a CIS Project on 'Caricom Integrity Systems'?***

There are research projects available focusing on national and local integrity systems. Pure descriptions of institutions, policies and

innovations are often not very convincing, though. Comparison is the starting point for knowledge as well as policy development, which was the basis of the sketched local integrity system project (with the involvement of policy-makers and researchers, a new and stimulating format). My concluding suggestion is simple. A comparable project for the national integrity systems of Caricom countries might lead to the same type of learning (knowledge and practice).

A 'CIS' project would bring together (a number of) Caricom countries, asking them to describe their institutions and policies in line with a format to be presented and add a self-evaluation as well as inviting independent researchers from the countries to evaluate that system. Such an endeavor could be very relevant for theory and practice.

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<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html>

<http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/StandardsCodes/InternationalCodeofConduct/tabid/1290/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

23

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/resins.htm>  
with *Conventions, Declarations and Other Instruments*  
Found in *General Assembly Resolutions*.

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